

Tab A

"But the biggest, richest and most widely in evidence of all the American networks was that aviary of exotic birds, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Its men were everywhere. The range of its operations was fantastic. It had money to burn and seemed to delight in burning it. It was not the least content to find out what was going on. It had a fine zeal for making things go on, and often succeeded. As the postwar descendant of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) it was infiltrated with Communists and lightly sprinkled with Nazis, but their secret affiliations didn't do much damage to the CIA in Europe for the simple reason that a bootlegged look inside some phase of its endeavors only served to confuse the beholder. Crediting the CIA with a coherent plan, based on a logical deduction from something one stumbled over, could cause a European all sorts of trouble. Having had a chance to size it up, however, the most sophisticated of the European networks often found ways of making a 'patsy' out of the CIA by taking its money--sometimes through middlemen informers--for things they themselves wanted explored. Often, that way, cash paid by the CIA for what it thought was an anti-Communist effort actually went to the Communists." (p. 99).

"The CIA was as ill-equipped to cope with anyone as expert, proud, sensitive and secretive as Goleniewski as Goleniewski was to cope with any agency as unsophisticated, clique-ridden and blandly disorganized as the CIA."

...

"On the other hand was a fabulously rich, loosely-administered and equally secretive bureaucracy with all kinds of security leaks, with as many hidden connections as a prairie-dog village and with a tediously long experience in finding defectors progressively less useful and more unmanageable from the day they arrived in this country." (p. 172).

"There are exceptionally able men and women in the CIA and I know a few of them. The organization's technical facilities are of the best. But the mammoth bureaucracy has been force-fed under poor administrators to a size which now makes it almost impossible to maintain any central cohesiveness or sharp professionalism. Fifty good reporters could transform it almost overnight. In its present form it is a veritable zoo of wandering experts few of whom have more than a hazy idea of what the

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others are up to. They're comforted by the thought that they are not supposed to know, anyway. As a complex organism somewhat similar to an enormous library, the CIA's one great professional skill is its ability to move with lightning speed to cover up all signs of its mistakes when they are threatened with exposure; and, if they can't be concealed, to shift the center of guilt elsewhere.

"Between crises, the ordinarily amorphous state of the CIA makes it highly susceptible to the manipulations of the many coteries of foreigners and foreign-born Americans on its payroll. These people--on whom the management is so dependant for knowledgeable information on foreign affairs--have found to their delight that they can influence the decisions of the native-born Americans. In their midst, without any doubt, are several KGB stooges. It is also evident that a few native-born Americans are on the KGB and GRU circuit.

"Sometimes these 'influencers' exert more power on the CIA than its own management. That is because they know exactly what they want and the management may not. Their moulding of policy reaches to their contacts on the staffs of Senators, Congressmen and the Congressional committees.

"The hallmark of the influencers is written all over the failure of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to pursue its original plans to interrogate Goleniewski in depth and in secret. Add to the story the pressure of the bankers, the Russians and the British who don't want his story to come out, and the blackout on him has been complete." (pp. 268-269)